I address the role of social mobility in political transitions. I develop a political economy model of regime transitions that incorporates social mobility as a key feature of the economy capturing the political attitudes toward redistribution. I show that social mobility facilitates democratization by reducing the conflict over redistribution between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, it facilitates democratic consolidation by reducing the likelihood of a coup under democracy. On the other hand, social mobility helps to keep an authoritarian regime stable by reducing the likelihood of mass movements against political elites.
Introduction
The role of social mobility in the fate of political regimes has been overlooked by social scientists, despite social mobility being raised as a central issue in public debates in many countries. For example, The Houston Chronicle (1 September 2002) notes that: few middle-class Mexicans expect to do better than their parents. More often they are focused on not slipping below the blurry line between working class and poor. Even if they do everything right -get an education and a professional job and spend their earnings only on life's necessities -people know there's no guarantee they will get ahead.
Mike Williams (17 November 2002) argues that 'the impoverished masses see little hope of success in systems dominated by tiny, rich elites' in Latin American countries. A letter to the Editor of the Financial Times (25 February 2002) suggests that liberal reforms cannot be 'keys to nirvana' to the poor economic situation and slow democratic progress in Argentina unless these reforms give top priority to opportunities for social mobility.
1 This problem stands out clearly in the political economy literature as well. While scholars recognize the effects of social mobility on redistributive politics as well as the importance of redistributive politics in political transitions, they have not addressed the role of social mobility on the discourse of political regimes. The major goal of this paper is to bring social mobility more explicitly into research on political transitions. Social mobility has long been thought to explain different attitudes toward redistributive politics (De Tocqueville, 1835; Marx, 1852; Hirschman, 1973; Piketty, 1995; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001; Benabou and Ö k, 2001 ). Benabou and Ö k (2001) formalize the mobility process as a key feature of the economy. They consider that people vote on the basis of their assessment of their prospects for social mobility (upward or downward) relative to the rest of the society. They show that there may be a range of incomes below average where people that expect to be rich in the future do not support high rates of redistribution. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) argue that, in 1990s Russia, support for further redistribution is strongest among the currently well-off Russians who fear losing their jobs and wealth, and weaker among the Russians with expectations of future welfare. Using individual level data from the US, Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) also find that social mobility negatively affects individual support for redistributive politics.
On the other hand, recent studies of political transitions have demonstrated a strong link between political transitions and redistributive politics Robinson, 2000, 2001; Rosendorff, 2001 ). Both Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) and Rosendorff (2001) argue that transition to democracy is more likely in societies whose income distribution is more egalitarian. However, despite the recognition of the effect of social mobility on attitudes towards redistributive politics, the implications of social mobility for political transitions still remain an open question in the political economy literature.
I address this question by combining these two different strands of the literature on social mobility and political transitions. My main argument is that social mobility accounts for the behavior of social classes and affects political transitions. To present my arguments in a theoretical framework, I build a political economy model of regime transitions upon Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) by incorporating social mobility as a key feature of the economy a`la Benabou and Ö k (2001) .
I consider a discrete time, infinite horizon model. The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. Each period, each agent belongs to a social class: upper class (the rich) or lower class (the poor). The rich are a privileged, high income minority that has disproportionate access to resources and power whereas the poor are an underprivileged, low income majority of the population. The demographics of the society are subject to change 466 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17(4) through social mobility: a poor (rich) agent may become rich (poor) next period with some probability. The government provides redistribution through taxation and transfers. The rich control the government under autocracy and the poor (the majority) under democracy. I assume that economically good times are often the case. Yet, the political regime may also face severe recessions that lead to social unrest (revolution from below or coup from above) and in turn lead to political transitions. This assumption is in line with the literature arguing that political transitions almost always occur during economically bad times Poole, 1990, 1996; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Geddes, 1999; Zak and Feng, 2003) .
I emphasize that, under autocracy, the rich prefer no redistribution during economically good times since there is no revolutionary threat. In other words, as Geddes (2000) argues, an authoritarian regime stays stable as long as its political elite manage the economy well. Only during bad times will the rich increase taxes to avoid a revolution. And only upon anticipating that a revolution cannot be prevented by a temporary tax increase will the rich enfranchise the poor. This is in line with Yashar's (1997) argument that democratic transitions do not occur as long as there is no social unrest that would push the rich (the elite) to move the regime towards democracy.
Under democracy, the poor prefer redistribution during economically good times since there is no coup threat. Only during bad times will the poor lower taxes to avoid a coup. Even then, the rich may attempt a coup in order to avoid higher redistribution rates in future (Gasiorowski, 1995; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) . Coups in Argentina in 1930 , Brazil in 1964 , and Chile in 1973 occurred to prevent further redistribution (Smith, 1978; Stepan, 1978) .
However, despite suffering from severe economic crises after their democratic transitions in the 1980s, Argentina and Brazil have not experienced high rates of redistribution that might have led to democratic breakdowns. Social mobility offers an explanation for the survival of these political regimes. One major implication of my model is that an increase in social mobility increases the likelihood of democratization 2 by decreasing the conflict over redistribution between the rich and the poor, and facilitates the stability of a democratic regime by decreasing the likelihood of a coup. Lamounier (1995) notes that after democratic transition, a significant degree of social mobility existed in Brazil despite severe economic inequality. Similarly, Catterberg and Zayuelas (1992) argue that, despite poor economic conditions of the 1980s, the people of Argentina strongly believed that they would have better living standards in future. Furthermore, the social unrest in 2002 against the political elite of Argentina is attributed in public debates to the loss of belief in social mobility accompanied by very poor economic conditions (e.g. see Williams, 2002) . Social mobility also offers an explanation for India, a country with a considerable poor population that could consolidate democracy. Das Gupta (1995: 308) stresses that in India, a promise of expansion of privileges offered a 'mobility incentive to a wider number in rural and urban areas who developed a sense of stake in the system more on the basis of aspirations than accomplishment'. Indian political leaders also used 'job reservation' not only as an expression of caste politics but more importantly as an instrument of social mobility on the part of backward castes to build and keep support for the democratic regime.
One other major implication of the model is that an increase in social mobility may facilitate the stability of an autocracy by decreasing the likelihood of a revolution. In late 19th century France, for example, the political leaders promoted social mobility to create a middle class with less inclination towards both revolution and redistributive conflicts (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) . In South Korea, the military rule expanded the number of students enrolled in higher education from 100,000 to 600,000 not only to supply an educated workforce for Korea's economy but also 'to satisfy a pervasive hunger for education, and to break up the virtual yangban monopoly on higher education' so as to provide expectations of social mobility for the lower class and delay democratization accordingly (Steinberg, 1995: 381) . In Thailand, provision of an 'important ladder for social mobility' through military and bureaucracy to middle and lower class children accounts for the limited class conflict and stable semi-democracy (Chai-Anan, 1995: 358) . Such strategies were also adopted by colonial powers to maintain their regime by giving hope to the colonized that they had a stake in the colonial regime and would have better lives under that regime (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) . Also, in Mexico, the deep economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s have largely eliminated the expectations of future welfare for the lower class people (Levy and Bruhn, 1995) . In particular, during the 1980s, inter-generational mobility was damaged due to slowed educational progress in the country (Binder and Woodruff, 2002) . Among other things, this stalled social mobility accounts for the enormous loss of confidence in the PRI's civilian authoritarian regime so that the PRI elites agreed to transfer power to a non-PRI president after 70 years of continuous political rule in Mexico.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the equilibrium and Section 4 performs the equilibrium analysis and presents the results. Section 5 assesses the impact of social mobility on political transitions. Section 6 concludes. All technical proofs are contained in the Appendix. 468 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17(4)
Model
My model builds on Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) by incorporating social mobility as a key feature of the economya la Benabou and Ö k (2001) . Therefore, almost all of my assumptions follow from these two papers. The time horizon is discrete and infinite. The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. There are two types of agents each period: the poor and the rich. The poor constitute the majority of the population. Let 2 ð0:5; 1Þ be the ratio of the poor. Agents discount future by the same discount rate :
Income of the country, w, is drawn from the following distribution each period: w ¼ w L with probability ; and w ¼ w H with probability 1 À ; where w H > w L ; and < 0:5; i.e. economic downturns are less likely. I will refer e ¼ H as a good time and e ¼ L as a bad time in the text.
The poor's share of income is : That is, when income is w e ; e 2 fH; Lg; per capita income of the poor is x e p ¼ ðw e =Þ and per capita income of the rich is x e r ¼ ð1 À Þw e =ð1 À Þ: I introduce social mobility into the model as a key feature of the economy adopting Behrman's (2000: 74) definition of relative (exchange) social mobility:
Holding total income and income distribution constant, after all, relative social mobility is greater if wealthier people more frequently change places with poorer people than if such exchanges occur less frequently. But the number of poorer people is the same whether there are more or fewer of such changes; they just are different people in different periods.
Hence, relative social mobility, rather than showing total income change in a society, shows relative social status within a society. Pastore (1982: 5) argues that '[i] n the analysis of the social dynamics, studies of upward and downward movements are equally important. The two types of mobility coexist in dynamic societies and bear equal relevance to understanding social development. ' Following Behrman (2000) and Pastore (1982) , I model social mobility as a Markov process as follows: An agent who is poor today moves upward and becomes rich tomorrow with probability q p : An agent who is rich today moves downward and becomes poor tomorrow with probability q r :
Each Markov process yields a stationary distribution in the long-run. In this stationary distribution, transition probabilities and population demographics satisfy the following: q p ¼ ð1 À Þq r ; that is, the number of poor agents that will move upward is equal to the number of rich agents that will move downward. 3. I introduce social mobility as an exogenous Markov process. My results reveal that social mobility affects the behavior of social classes, so social mobility itself arises as an important policy variable. A future research direction on explaining differences in social mobility across countries and across time within a country is to endogenize social mobility as a choice variable in the model. I perform my analysis in the steady state of this Markov process. In this state, aggregate income, the relative sizes of social classes, so the income distribution and income inequality remain constant. This allows me to perform comparative statics exercises purely on (relative) social mobility by keeping income inequality and income distribution constant throughout time. 4 Redistribution occurs through taxation. When the tax rate is ; and the transfers made by the government are T; the disposable income of an individual with income x is given by ð1 À Þx þ T: I assume that preferences over disposable income are risk neutral, that is ð1 À Þx þ T is also the utility level of that individual. I borrow this assumption from Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) and Benabou and Ö k (2001) . It allows me to abstract from the issue of risk distribution.
Taxing is costly due to deadweight loss. When the economy is in state e 2 fH; Lg and the tax rate is 2 ½0; 1; the total cost of taxing income is CðÞw e . Balanced budget requires that T ¼ ð À CðÞÞw e : Again, in order to abstract from risk distribution I assume that CðÞ ¼ c where c 2 ð0; 1Þ is constant.
5 Following Benabou and Ö k (2001) , I assume that fiscal policy takes time to implement: 6 tomorrow's tax rate is set today.
7
The political state or the regime can be autocracy ðAÞ, democracy ðDÞ or revolution ðRevÞ. Only one political transition may occur within a period. The initial political state is autocracy. My analysis is valid when the initial political state is democracy as well.
At the beginning of each period, first of all, social mobility occurs. Next, income is realized and redistribution occurs according to the tax rate that 470 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17 (4) 4. See Rosendorff (2001) for the effect of changes in the relative size of competing groups on political transitions. Rosendorff (2001) argues that the relative sizes of competing groups matter for political transitions. The change in the relative size of competing groups in his model may be attributed to social mobility. However, his model does not exhibit a dynamic mobility process. Furthermore, he studies a static model in which only one transition from an autocracy to a democracy is possible. Therefore, his comparative statics on the relative size of groups do not reflect the effect of social mobility on transitions through the society's prospects towards mobility.
5. A strictly convex cost function would induce convex preferences over tax rate even if we assume risk-neutral preferences over disposable income. To see this, take two tax rates 1 ; 2 2 ½0; 1; 1 6 ¼ 2 :
That is, the individual has strictly convex (risk averse) preferences over tax rates under balanced budget.
6. See Wright (1996) for further discussions on modelling taxation under social mobility. 7. One may tend to assume that a coup prevents current redistribution within a period, even though implementing a new tax rate different than zero in that period is impossible. This additional assumption does not change my conclusions about social mobility and political transitions. For the sake of simplifying my presentation, I abstract from this possibility.
has been set in the previous period. Then, the timing of the events and political transition within this period is given as follows.
Under autocracy, the rich hold the power and decide whether or not to enfranchise the poor. If the rich extend the franchise, then the regime switches to democracy and the poor set the tax rate for the next period. Otherwise, the rich choose a tax rate for the next period, and the poor decide whether to revolt or not. If the poor revolt, the rich of that period lose everything for ever, and the regime switches to revolution. Following Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) , the revolution is an absorbing political state. There is no class difference and income is shared equally thereafter. Extending franchise always prevents a revolution. Increasing tax may prevent it as well. If the rich do not extend the franchise and the poor do not revolt, then the tax rate that the rich set prevails, and the regime remains authoritarian (Figure 1) . Revolution is costly. Let rev ( 0 rev ) be the onetime per capita cost of a revolution during bad (good) times:
Under democracy, the poor (the majority) hold the power and set a tax rate for the next period. Then, the rich decide whether to attempt a coup or not. If the rich attempt a coup, the regime switches to autocracy and the rich determine the tax rate for the next period. Otherwise, the tax rate that the poor set prevails, and the regime remains democratic (Figure 2) . Coup is costly. Let coup ( 0 coup ) be the per capita cost of a coup during bad (good) times. 
Equilibrium
Following Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) , in order to avoid the free-rider problem during a revolution (coup), I assume that if a revolution (coup) is LEVENTOG LU: SOCIAL MOBILITY 471 8. I assume that a revolution or a coup changes the political state with probability 1. Ghate, Le and Zak (2003) argue that the taxation policy may change the effectiveness of social unrest. I abstract from such complications to better isolate the impact of social mobility on political transitions. Figure 1 . Autocracy attempted, and a fraction < 1 of the poor (rich) take part in it, then the revolution (coup) always succeeds. In turn, I can treat the rich as one player and the poor as another player. Then, I can represent this economy as a repeated game between two agents.
I characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. A Markov perfect equilibrium consists of Markov perfect strategies that depend only on the current state of the world and the prior actions taken within the same period. This equilibrium notion embeds an important assumption: neither player can commit to future actions. 9 Furthermore, it generates a stationary equilibrium path.
In any period, the state of the world is given by the regime, the tax rate, and the income level. Formally, the state of the world is denoted by S ¼ ðR; ; eÞ. R denotes the regime and it can be one of A (autocracy), D (democracy) or Rev (revolution). is the tax rate that will be applied in this period. e is either H or L and its value is realized at the beginning of the current period. R and are determined by the end of the previous period.
The strategy of the rich can be expressed as a function of the state of the world, and the tax decision of the poor under a democratic regime. The rich's strategy consists of three decisions: (i) whether to extend the franchise under autocracy, (ii) where to set the tax rate under autocracy in case the rich decide not to extend the franchise, and (iii) whether to attempt a coup under democracy. Similarly, the strategy of the poor can be expressed as a function of the state of the world and the rich's decision on extending the franchise and the tax rate the rich set if the rich want to keep the autocracy. The poor's strategy consists of two decisions: (i) whether to attempt a revolution under autocracy, and (ii) where to set the tax rate under democracy. 472 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17(4) Figure 2 . Democracy 9. This equilibrium notion also embodies an important philosophical consideration: these strategies suggest the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality. That is, these strategies make behavior in any period depend on only the state of the world rather than on the entire history of the play. Moreover, it is straightforward to calculate the rational expectations. For a similar discussion on Markov strategies, see Maskin and Tirole (2001) .
A Markov perfect pure strategy profile constitutes a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium if each player's strategy is a best response to that of the other in all possible states. I refer the reader to the Appendix for a more formal definition.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, I characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game played between the poor and the rich. First, I make two assumptions that restrict my model in an empirically plausible way.
I borrow these assumptions from Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) . In good times, the cost of revolution ( 0 rev ) and the cost of coup ( 0 coup ) are so high that the poor prefer not to revolt under autocracy in good times, and the rich prefer not to attempt a coup under democracy in good times.
The democratization literature essentially agrees that political transitions through a revolution or a coup occur generally during economically bad times, and in turn supports this assumption (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Gasiorowski, 1995; Przeworski et al., 1996; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Geddes, 1999) .
Thus, the rich (poor) can choose any tax rate in good times under autocracy (democracy) without triggering a revolution (coup). Under this assumption, a revolution or a coup is likely only during bad times.
My next assumption guarantees that either there is no conflict between poor and rich over redistribution (they prefer the same tax rate), or the poor prefer higher redistribution rates (higher taxes) whereas the rich prefer lower redistribution rates (lower taxes), everything else being equal. This is in line with Ravallion and Lokshin's (2001: 87) finding that support for redistribution tends to be greater among the poor than the rich. I need to introduce some more notations before stating the assumption. Let i; j 2 fp; rg and i 6 ¼ j: Let " x x i denote the expected income of agent i before the realization of w in a period, i.e. "
H be the expected national income. Let " w w i denote the expected income of agent i before the realization of social mobility at the beginning of the period, i.e. "
w w is agent i 's one-period expected disposable income when the tax rate for that period is : The tax rate that maximizes agent i 's one-period expected disposable income is the solution of the following problem: Then c r < c p would guarantee that the range of c for which the rich prefer a higher rate of redistribution, ½0; c r ; is a subset of that of the poor, ½0; c p . That is, under this assumption, the poor's preferred rate of redistribution is higher than or equal to that of the rich for any given cost of taxation, c. The following technical lemma characterizes this situation. I give all the proofs in the Appendix.
Lemma
In this case, there will be no threat of a revolution or a coup anytime, since there is no conflict over redistribution. Then, all the agents will be indifferent between autocracy and democracy. Introducing even a very small cost for keeping an autocracy implies that the rich's optimal decision in this case is to extend the franchise under autocracy. For the sake of simplicity, without introducing such additional cost, I will assume that the rich extend the franchise when c p c and analyze the model when c < c p : This is the region in which a conflict over redistribution occurs: the poor prefer the highest redistribution rate ( p ¼ 1) , whereas the rich prefer no distribution at all ( r ¼ 0).
Characterization of the Equilibrium
A Markov perfect equilibrium generates a stationary transition pattern. Consider the very beginning of a period that starts under the regime R, and the tax rate . Let V i ðR; Þ be agent i 's expected utility on the transition path from that point on. The regime R may switch to another regime R 0 in that period. Let the cost of transition be ðR; R 0 Þ ¼ ð coup = Þ if the transition from R to R 0 is due to a coup; ðR; R 0 Þ ¼ ð rev = Þ if the transition from R to R 0 is due to a revolution; and ðR; R 0 Þ ¼ 0 otherwise. Remember that social unrest is possible only in bad times. Then
where
where ðR 0 ; 0 Þ is the next regime and the tax rate if it is a bad time, and ðR 00 ; 00 Þ is the next regime and the tax rate if it is a good time. Redistribution will occur according to in the beginning of the current period.
The expression for V i ðR; Þ captures that agent i may become j with probability q i . Taking social mobility into account, agent i 's expected current 474 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17(4) disposable income is " Y Y d i ðÞ: Agent i becomes a type j with probability q i . Then, the agent's personal discounted continuation utility will be W j ðRÞ: Agent i will remain type i with probability 1 À q i : Then the personal discounted continuation utility will be W i ðRÞ:
The expression for W i ðRÞ captures that it will be a bad time with probability : In this case, the regime and the tax rate will switch to ðR 0 ; 0 Þ on the transition path. Then agent i 's expected payoff at the very beginning of the next period is V i ðR 0 ; 0 Þ À ðR; R 0 Þ: It will be a good time with probability 1 À : In this case, the regime and the tax rate will switch to ðR 00 ; 00 Þ on the transition path. Then agent i 's expected payoff at the very beginning of the next period is V i ðR 00 ; 00 Þ: Since a transition in a good time is not due to social unrest, ðR; R 00 Þ ¼ 0: Let y d i denote the current disposable income of agent i after realization of a low w; i.e.
L where is determined in the previous period: Note that y d i is not affected by any current decision of agents, since is set in the previous period. The characterization of the equilibrium is not a trivial extension of Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) . There is no social mobility in their work, so each social class prefers holding the power. How social mobility affects the preferences of agents over different regimes is not obvious. For example, a high social mobility rate might induce the rich to prefer extending the franchise, thinking that they could become poor with a high probability next period. Or, the poor might prefer not to prevent a coup under democracy, thinking that they could become rich next period and enjoy autocracy. I show in the Appendix that there does not exist any equilibrium in which a social class in power does not avoid regime transition although it can avoid it via redistribution (Propositions 8 and 9). Then, in any equilibrium, the social class that holds the power will try to keep the power as long as it can. Now, I will propose several critical values that will be crucial in characterizing the equilibrium.
The first two critical values concern the cost of coup, coup . Consider the following stationary transition pattern: under autocracy, the rich keep the regime authoritarian and set the tax rate at 0 during good times. The rich extend the franchise in a bad time, then the poor set the tax rate at 1: Under democracy, the poor set the tax rate at 1 during good times and at during bad times. Democracy prevails forever. Assuming that this transition pattern will prevail from the next period on, the payoff of alternative actions to the rich in this period during a bad time under democracy can be calculated as follows:
. The rich's payoff of attempting a coup then setting the tax rate at zero is given by y Let coup ¼ ðÞ be such that the rich are indifferent between a coup and no coup, i.e. ðÞ ¼ V r ðA; 0Þ À V r ðD; Þ ½ : Define the following: l ¼ ð0Þ and h ¼ ð1Þ: Then, when coup < l ; for any tax rate, the rich prefer a coup rather than no coup along the transition path above. On the other hand, when coup > h ; for any tax rate, the rich prefer no coup rather than a coup. These values vary with the level of social mobility, q p . The next proposition compares these critical values for all values of q p (see Figure 3 ):
The next two critical values concern the cost of revolution, rev : Consider the following stationary transition pattern: the regime remains authoritarian and the rich always set the tax rate at zero during good times and at during bad times.
Assuming that this transition pattern will prevail from the next period on, the payoff of alternative actions to the poor in this period during a bad time under autocracy can be calculated as follows:
. The poor's payoff from revolting and setting the tax rate at zero thereafter is given by y rev < l ; for any tax rate, the poor prefer to revolt rather than not to revolt along the transition path above. On the other hand, when rev > h ; for any tax rate, the poor prefer not to revolt rather than revolt (see Figure 3) .
Next, suppose that h > rev ! l : Consider the following transition pattern: the regime remains authoritarian, the rich set the tax rate at 0 during good times and at r during bad times. Let r be such that V p ðA; r Þ ¼ À rev þ V p ðRev; 0Þ: That is, r is the tax rate that just prevents a revolution along this transition pattern. The proof of the existence of r 2 ½0; 1 is given in the Appendix (Proposition 10). Finally, suppose that h > coup ! l : Consider the following transition pattern: under autocracy, the rich set the tax rate at 0 during a good time and extend the franchise during a bad time. Once the regime switches to democracy, it remains democratic, the poor set the tax rate at 1 during good times and at d during bad times. Let d be such that V r ðD; d Þ ¼ À coup þ V r ðA; 0Þ: That is, d is the tax rate that just prevents a coup along this transition pattern. The proof of the existence of d 2 ½0; 1 is given in the Appendix (Proposition 11).
Remember that c p is the critical value of cost of taxation above which the poor do not prefer redistribution. Then the following theorem characterizes the Markov perfect equilibrium.
Theorem:
1. When c ! c p ; the regime switches to democracy. The tax rate is always set at zero. The rich do not attempt a coup. When c < c p : 2. If rev ! h , the regime stays authoritarian. The rich always set the tax rate at zero. The poor do not attempt a revolution. 3. If h > rev ! l , the regime stays authoritarian. The rich set the tax rate at zero during good times and at r during bad times. 4. If rev < l and coup ! h ; the rich set the tax rate at zero during good times under autocracy. They extend the franchise during the first bad time. The poor always set the tax rate at 1. The rich do not attempt a coup.
LEVENTOG LU: SOCIAL MOBILITY 477 5. If rev < l and h > coup ! l ; the rich set the tax rate at zero during good times under autocracy. They extend the franchise during the first bad time, then the poor set the tax rate at 1. Under democracy, the poor set the tax rate at 1 during good times. They set the tax rate at d during bad times. The rich do not attempt a coup. 6. If rev < l and l > coup ; the rich set the tax rate at zero during good times under autocracy. They extend the franchise during the first bad time, then the poor set the tax rate at 1. Under democracy, the poor set the tax rate at 1 during good times. The rich attempt a coup during bad times and set the tax rate at zero.
First, social mobility induces a range, c ! c p ; where there is no conflict over redistribution across social classes. In this case, the regime switches to democracy regardless of the values of the other parameters in the model. When c < c p ; the conflict over redistribution appears between the poor and the rich. Under autocracy, the rich prefer no redistribution during economically good times since there is no revolutionary threat. In other words, as Geddes (2000) argues, an authoritarian regime stays stable as long as the political elite manages the economy well. During bad times, the rich will increase taxes to avoid a revolution. And only when they anticipate that they will not be able to prevent a revolution by a temporary tax increase will the rich extend the franchise to the poor. This is in line with Yashar's (1997) argument that democratic transitions do not occur as long as there is no social or political unrest that would push the rich (the elite) to move the regime towards democracy. Under democracy, the poor prefer full redistribution during economically good times since there is no coup threat. Only during bad times will the poor lower taxes to avoid a coup. However, sometimes even a zero tax rate may not prevent a coup (Gasiorowski, 1991; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) . For example, military coups in Argentina in 1930, Brazil in 1964, and Chile in 1973 occurred to prevent further redistribution (Smith, 1978; Stepan, 1978) .
Furthermore, if social mobility is sufficiently high, then h ¼ l (Proposition 2), so that there does not exist an autocracy under which the rich prevent revolution via redistribution during bad times. In other words, this striking result states that when social mobility is high, an authoritarian regime can be stabilized without any redistribution, and a revolt is avoided by the poor's future prospects of becoming rich. However, if the cost of revolution is sufficiently low, the only way of avoiding a revolt is democratization. This result is in contrast to Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001) , who obtain a range of where the rich can avoid a revolt by increasing redistribution. Their model with linear deadweight loss of taxation is a special case of my model with no social mobility, i.e. q p ¼ 0. Thus, social mobility arises as an important factor 478 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17(4) in determining equilibrium transition patterns. See Figure 3 for a summary of these results. Figure 3 is more than a summary of the Theorem: it shows how these critical values, hence the nature of political transition, are affected by social mobility as mobility increases. In the next section, I discuss the effects of social mobility on political transitions, which is the main contribution of my paper to the political economy literature.
Impact of Social Mobility on Political Transitions
Since I model social mobility as a stationary Markov process, the reader should interpret my comparative statics results for cross-country variations or for unanticipated changes within a single country. In other words, the following propositions compare critical values that determine political transitions in different countries with different levels of social mobility or in a single country before and after an unanticipated change in the level of social mobility.
Proposition 3: ðd l =dq p Þ < 0:
As social mobility increases, the range of the cost of a coup ½0; l ; in which democracy is broken by a coup, shrinks. That is, everything else being equal in two countries (including income inequalities in these countries), a coup is less likely under democracy in the country with the higher level of social mobility. Or, everything else being equal, if an unanticipated increase in social mobility occurs in a country, the likelihood of a coup under democracy decreases accordingly.
When coup > h ; i.e. if the cost of coup is sufficiently high, the rich never attempt a coup under democracy. I refer to this case as a consolidated democracy. As social mobility increases, the range of the cost of coup ½ h ; 1Þ; in which democracy is consolidated, expands. That is, everything else being equal in two countries (including income inequalities in these countries), democratic consolidation is more likely in the country with the higher level of social mobility. Or, everything else being equal, if an unanticipated increase in social mobility occurs in a country, the likelihood of a democratic consolidation increases accordingly.
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Proposition 5: ðdc p =dq p Þ < 0:
An increase in social mobility narrows down the range of cost ½0; c p ; in which a conflict between the rich and poor over redistribution occurs. Note that the regime switches to a consolidated democracy out of this region. So, social mobility may trigger democratization by eliminating the conflict over redistribution.
These results are consistent with the empirical facts: huge inequalities in income distribution did not 'petrify' inequalities in status in Brazil (Pastore, 1982; Lamounier, 1995) . Lamounier (1995) notes that after democratic transition, a significant degree of social mobility existed in Brazil despite severe economic inequality. Catterberg and Zayuelas (1992) argue that, despite a poor social and economic situation in the 1980s, the people of Argentina strongly believed that they would have better living standards in the future. Thus, social mobility accounts for how these fledgling political regimes have survived for over a decade. Furthermore, the social unrest in 2002 against the political elite of Argentina is attributed in public debates to the loss of belief in social mobility accompanied by very poor economic conditions (e.g. see Williams, 2002) . Social mobility also offers an explanation for India, a country with a considerable poor population that could consolidate democracy. Das Gupta (1995: 308) stresses that in India, a promise of expansion of privileges offered a 'mobility incentive to a wider number in rural and urban areas who developed a sense of stake in the system more on the basis of aspirations than accomplishment'. Indian political leaders also used 'job reservation' not only as an expression of caste politics but more importantly as an instrument of social mobility on the part of backward castes to build and keep support for the democratic regime.
Proposition 6: ðd l =dq p Þ < 0: When rev ! l ; i.e. if the cost of revolution is sufficiently high, the rich keep autocracy, and the rich extend the franchise only when the cost of revolution is low, rev < l . Thus, as social mobility increases, the region in which autocracy prevails expands. In other words, the poor that are ready to revolt ( rev < l ) may prefer not to revolt after an unanticipated increase in social mobility ( rev > 0 l ; where 0 l is the new critical lower value for rev after the unanticipated increase in social mobility).
In late 19th century France, for example, the political leaders promoted social mobility to create a middle class with less inclination both towards revolution and redistributive conflicts (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) . The military rule in South Korea expanded the number of students enrolled in higher education from 100,000 to 600,000 not only to supply an educated workforce for Korea's economy but also 'to satisfy a pervasive hunger for 480 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 17(4) education, and to break up the virtual yangban monopoly on higher education' so as to provide expectations of social mobility for the lower class and delay democratization accordingly (Steinberg, 1995: 381) . In Thailand, provision of an 'important ladder for social mobility' through military and bureaucracy to middle and lower class children offers an explanation for low class conflict and stable semi-democracy (Chai-Anan, 1995: 358) . Such strategies were also adopted by colonial powers to maintain their regime by giving hope to the colonized that they had a stake in the colonial regime and would have better lives under that regime (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000) . The case of Mexico demonstrates an example in the reverse direction. In Mexico, the deep economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s have largely eliminated the expectations of future welfare for lower class people. The Mexican data demonstrate that, during the 1980s, inter-generational mobility was damaged due to slowed educational progress in the country (Binder and Woodruff, 2002) . Among other things, this stalled social mobility has led to the loss of confidence for the PRI's civilian authoritarian regime that the PRI elites agreed to transfer power to a non-PRI president after 70 years of continuous political rule in Mexico.
Conclusion
Social mobility has been a central policy issue in public debates around the world and its effects on attitudes towards redistributive politics have been intensively studied in the political economy literature. On the other hand, recent studies of democratization have demonstrated a strong link between redistributive politics and political transitions. However, despite recognition of the link between social mobility and redistributive politics, the relationship between social mobility and political transitions has been overlooked by the literature. I address this question by developing a model of political transitions that incorporates social mobility as a key feature of the economy. My findings suggest the following implications for future empirical work: social mobility facilitates democratization by reducing the conflict over redistribution between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, it facilitates democratic consolidation by reducing the likelihood of a coup. Social mobility can also keep an authoritarian regime stable by reducing the likelihood of a revolution against the political elite. These results also suggest a further research agenda with a focus on social mobility as a policy variable for ruling classes.
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LEVENTOG LU: SOCIAL MOBILITY 481 10. As in the South Korea and Thailand examples, education is one of the major policies to change level of social mobility in a society. Such policies may also have an impact on economic growth, an issue that I abstract from in this paper. For example, see Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) for the effect of education on economic growth through social status.
A. Equilibrium Definition
Formally, let r ðS j p Þ denote the strategy of the rich. This is a function of the state of the world, S, and the tax decision of the poor, p : The rich's strategy consists of three components: f franchise; coup; r g: If the rich extend the franchise, then franchise ¼ 1, otherwise franchise ¼ 0: franchise applies in states ðA; :; :Þ: If the rich attempt a coup, then coup ¼ 1, otherwise coup ¼ 0. coup applies in states ðD; :; :Þ: r is the tax rate set by the rich. The rich set a tax rate when (S ¼ ðA; :; :Þ and franchise ¼ 0) or (S ¼ ðD; :; :Þ and coup ¼ 1).
Let p ðS j franchise; r Þ denote the strategy of the poor. This is a function of the state of the world, S, the rich's decision on extending the franchise, franchise; and the tax decision of the rich, r : The poor's strategy consists of two components: frevolution; p g: If the poor attempt a revolution, then revolution ¼ 1, otherwise revolution ¼ 0: revolution applies in states S ¼ ðA; :; :Þ: p is the tax rate set by the poor. The poor set a tax rate when (S ¼ ðA; :; :Þ and franchise ¼ 1), S ¼ ðD; :; :Þ or S ¼ ðRev; :; :Þ:
These strategies generate a transition between states as follows: The world starts with ðA; 1 ; eÞ where 1 is given at the beginning of period 1. Starting from ðA; ; eÞ in any period, if there is a revolution, then the state transits to ðRev; 0; eÞ: A revolutionary state is an absorbing state. There is no class difference in a revolutionary state. Income is shared equally thereafter, so ¼ 0 is the optimal decision of the players. If there is no revolution, and the rich enfranchise the poor, then the state transits to ðD; p ; eÞ: If the rich do not extend the franchise, and there is no revolution, then the state transits to ðA; r ; eÞ: Starting from ðD; ; eÞ, if there is no coup, then the state transits to ðD; p ; eÞ: Otherwise, it transits to ðA; r ; eÞ: Let PðS 0 j p ; r ; S Þ denote the probability distribution function of transition from S to S 0 as a function of the strategies p and r :
A Markov perfect pure strategy profile ð p ðS j franchise; r Þ; r ðSj p ÞÞ constitutes a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium if p and r are best responses to each other in all possible states. Markov perfect strategies allow for the following Bellman equations: where Y d i is the disposable income of an agent of type i 2 fp; rg as a function of S; p and r : Thus, U i is the net present discounted payoff of agent i as his current disposable income plus his discounted future payoff. Note that Bellman equations take social mobility into account: a poor agent will become rich with probability q p next period; and a rich agent will become poor with probability q r : A Markov perfect pure strategy profile ð p ðS j franchise; r Þ; r ðS j p ÞÞ constitutes a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium if p solves (1) and r solves (2).
B. Proofs
Let Q ¼ 1 À q p À q r : Then Q ¼ 1 À ðq p =1 À Þ ¼ 1 À ðq r =Þ and " w w r À " w w p ¼ Qð " x x r À " x x p Þ:
Lemma 1: c r < c p if only if q p < 1 À .
Proof: c r < c p , " w w p < " w w r , 0 < " w w r À " w w p ¼ Qð " x x r À " x x p Þ , 0 < Q: The last inequality follows from the fact that " x x r > " x x p : Then the last statement is equivalent to q p < 1 À : This completes the proof.
Next, I will give some preliminary results. I will use these results in the proofs later.
Lemma 2: The maximum of ðd=dq r Þðq r Q=ð1 À QÞÞ is 1=ð1 À Þ when q r ¼ 0 and its minimum is À1 when q r ¼ . The maximum of ðd=dq p Þðq r Q=ð1 À QÞÞ is 1=ð1 À Þ when q p ¼ 0 and its minimum is À1 when q p ¼ .
Proof:
To see this result, compute the following: ðd 2 =dq 2 r Þ½q r Q=ð1 À QÞ ¼ À2= ð1 À QÞ 2 À 2=ð1 À QÞ 3 < 0: So, the maximum of ðd=dq r Þ½ðq r Q=ð1 À QÞ ¼ Q=ð1 À QÞ À q r =ð1 À QÞ 2 is 1=ð1 À Þ when q r ¼ 0 and its minimum is À1 when q r ¼ : Note that Q ¼ 1 when q r ¼ 0 and Q ¼ 0 when q r ¼ : To prove the remaining, note that ðd=dq p Þ½q p Q=ð1 À QÞ ¼ ðd=dq r Þ½q r Q=ð1 À QÞ: This completes the proof.
Stationary Transition Patterns
Stable Autocracy, A(s): The regime remains autocratic. The rich set the tax rate at 0 in a good time, and at ! 0 in a bad time. The value functions along this transition path can be calculated as follows: the minimum of À is attained when q r ¼ : This value is equal to c " w w > 0: So, Àðq r Þ > 0 for all q r < : This completes the proof of V r ðA; 1Þ > V r ðD; 1Þ: That is, the rich prefer the autocracy with the worst payoff for them to the democracy with the best payoff for them. Then I can generalize this for any r and d by applying Lemmas 3 and 4.
Next consider the following case: if the rich extend the franchise then the rich attempt a coup in a bad time under democracy in the equilibrium of the subgame. Then the poor optimally set the tax rate at 1 in good times, the rich attempt a coup and the regime switches back to autocracy in a bad time. If the rich of today prefer to extend the franchise in a bad time under autocracy, then the rich of the future prefer to extend the franchise in a bad time under autocracy as well. This contradicts the hypothesis that the rich of the future will prefer autocracy to democracy. This completes the proof. 5. Since rev < l ; there does not exist a tax rate that prevents a revolution. Then the rich extend the franchise in a bad time under autocracy. By Proposition 11, there exists a unique d 2 ½0; 1 such that V r ðD; d Þ ¼ À coup þ V r ðA; 0Þ along Dð d ):
In order Dð d ) to be an equilibrium path, I need to show that the poor prefer to set the tax rate at d rather than trigger a coup during a bad time under democracy given that the poor of the future will prefer to do so as well. Then the poor optimally set the tax rate at 1 in good times and at d in bad times, d as given in Proposition 11.
Consider the values generated along Dð d ). In order for this pattern to be realized in an equilibrium, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) d just prevents a coup in a bad time under democracy: V r ðD; d Þ ¼ À coup þ V r ðA; 0Þ; i.e. ð coup =Þ ¼ V r ðA; 0ÞÀ V r ðD; d Þ; (2) the poor prefer democracy to a coup, i.e. V p ðD; d Þ ! À coup þ V p ðA; 0Þ, i.e. ð coup =Þ ! V p ðA; 0Þ À V p ðD; d Þ:
(1) is guaranteed by Proposition 11. In contrast, suppose that (2) is not satisfied along this stationary transition path, i.e. ð coup =Þ < V p ðA; 0Þ À V p ðD; d Þ: Equivalently,
